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 Abstract 
We analyze the incentive effects of organizational forms using data from 
Florida’s Non-Emergency Medicaid Transportation (NEMT) programs. These programs 
differ in the extent to which their brokers are directly involved in providing transit 
services. Based on a simple model of moral hazard, we predict that the number of users 
and the number of claims per user of the program increase, but cost per claim of the 
program decreases, as its broker’s share of transit services increases. The empirical 
evidence supports our theoretical predictions on the incentive effects of different 
organizational forms.  
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1. Introduction 
The optimal design of incentive contracts and the optimal structuring of 
organizations are of central interest to economists. Although the theoretical literature 
offers many interesting predictions, the empirical literature provides few tests of these 
predictions due to a lack of appropriate data. This paper provides an empirical test of the 
incentive effects of organizational forms, using data from Florida’s Non-Emergency 
Medicaid Transportation (NEMT) programs. 
The Social Security Act and accompanying regulations require that state Medicaid 
programs provide Medicaid beneficiaries access to non-emergency transportation to and 
from medical appointments. Florida’s NEMT programs contract with separate entities, 
commonly referred to as brokers, to control the costs, quality, and utilization of services. 
These programs differ in the extent to which their brokers are directly involved in 
providing transit services, referred to as their organizational forms. 
We analyze the incentive effects of organizational forms on brokers’ performance 
with a simple model of moral hazard. We show that, given the compensation structure, a 
broker supplies more effort on both quality assurance and cost reduction but less effort on 
screening trip eligibility as its share of transit services increases. Consequently, the 
number of Medicaid beneficiaries using services and the number of claims per user 
increase as the broker’s share of transit services increases. Moreover, for a given number 
of claims, cost per claim decreases as the broker’s share of transit services increases.  
We test our theoretical propositions using cost and utilization data of Florida’s 
NEMT programs in all sixty-seven Florida counties from fiscal year 1991 to 2002.  We 
estimate the incentive effects using a two-step procedure to control for the endogeneity of 
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the choice of organizational forms. The empirical evidence supports our theoretical 
propositions and is robust to empirical specifications. Our findings suggest that the 
choice of organizational form has important incentive effects on performance.  
Our study provides an empirical test of contract theory. There exists a small but 
growing body of evidence supporting the existence of incentive effects in organizations. 
Lazear (2000) and Paarsch and Shearer (1999, 2000) consider the impact of piece rates 
on the performance of workers. Banker, Lee, and Potter (1996) study the effect of piece 
rates on sales in retail department stores. McMillan, Whalley, and Zhu (1989) and Grove 
et al. (1994) study how the changes of compensation practice in Chinese economic 
reforms have affected performance levels. Fernie and Metcalf (1999) consider the effect 
of compensation systems on the performance of British jockeys. Laffont and Matoussi 
(1995) study the relationship between production and the tenant’s share of the product in 
a sharecropping contract. These studies find considerable effects of compensation on 
performance. Our study complements their findings by demonstrating the incentive 
effects of organizational forms on performance under a given compensation system. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces Florida’s 
NEMT programs. Section 3 develops a simple model of moral hazard to analyze the 
incentive effects of different organizational forms on a broker’s effort decision, and 
derives empirical implications of the model. Section 4 describes our data and 
econometric method. Section 5 presents the estimation results of our econometric 
analysis. Section 6 summarizes the results and discusses some of the restrictions and 
generalizations of our study. 
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2. Florida’s NEMT Program 
The Social Security Act and accompanying regulations require that state Medicaid 
programs provide Medicaid beneficiaries access to non-emergency transportation to and 
from medical appointments. Most states meet the requirement by reimbursing recipients 
for transporting themselves or by enrolling transportation providers and paying them a 
fee for service. 
However, the traditional, decentralized, fee-for-service approach to managing 
non-emergency Medicaid transportation has not been very effective in controlling costs, 
or fraud and abuse, or in assuring universal access to medical care. The Health Care 
Financing Administration estimated that NEMT costs increased ten percent annually 
nationwide between 1990 and 1995. In some individual states, NEMT costs increased 
much more rapidly, e.g., in Louisiana in the four years from 1990 to 1994 NEMT costs 
more than tripled, and in Georgia from 1993 to 1994 costs more than tripled in just one 
year. 
In recent years, many states, including the state of Florida, have begun searching 
for more effective approaches to manage non-emergency transportation. An increasingly 
popular way is contracting with separate entities, commonly referred to as brokers, who 
serve as “gatekeepers” to control the costs and utilization of service and to assure quality 
of service and access to care. This approach to managing Medicaid transportation is 
known as the brokerage model. 
By statute, Florida established a statewide Transportation Disadvantaged (TD) 
program which supports services for those who cannot provide their own transportation 
due to age, physical or mental infirmity or financial limitation. The TD program includes 
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all transportation programs in Florida that are supported by federal, state, or local 
funding. Florida’s NEMT program has participated in the TD program since FY 1996. 
The TD Commission selects a local Community Transportation Coordinator 
(CTC) for each county. CTCs accept calls and authorize non-emergency transportation 
for Medicaid beneficiaries, determine if the beneficiary has access to transportation other 
than Medicaid–financed transport, verify beneficiary eligibility for Medicaid, determine 
that the transportation is for receiving a Medicaid-covered service, and select the most 
reasonable and cost effective mode of transport based on the beneficiary’s physical and 
mental condition. They must also select the least costly transportation carrier, arrange 
transportation with the appropriate carrier, monitor the use of transportation by Medicaid 
beneficiaries, and assess problems related to trip cancellations and no-shows, misuse of 
transportation, and abusive behavior. 
In each county, the Local Coordinating Board (LCB) monitors the CTC in 
determining how effectively local needs are being met. Furthermore, the LCB selects the 
CTC via a competitive bid process based on its evaluation of each broker’s corporate 
experience, performance, references, resources, qualifications and costs. The CTC is 
required to either contract with outside transit service providers or provide some or all of 
the transportation itself. Table 1 shows the three different organizational forms used by 
CTCs that differ in the extent the CTCs are directly involved with providing transit 
services. CTCs are normally paid a fixed fee per trip and transit providers are normally 
paid a fixed fee, which varies with transportation modes, plus mileage. 
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Table 1 
Taxonomy of Organizational Forms 
 
Coordinator Type Characteristics 
Brokerage Only Provides only brokerage service 
Partially Integrated Provides brokerage service and some transit services 
Fully Integrated Sole source of all brokerage and transit services 
 
 
3. Theory and Implications 
 In this section, we analyze the incentive effects of different organizational forms 
with a simple model of moral hazard. We then derive the implications of the incentive 
effects on the cost and utilization of NEMT programs. 
 
3.1. The demand for NEMT services. 
 A Medicaid beneficiary’s demand function for eligible rides is , where x is 
a parameter affecting the beneficiary’s valuation of eligible rides and q is the broker’s 
effort in quality assurance. The parameter x is distributed between  and  with 
distribution function . For any given amount of rides, a beneficiary’s marginal 
valuation of eligible rides increases as x increases.  
),( qxj
0x 1x
)(xF
 On the other hand, a beneficiary’s demand function for ineligible rides is 
, where y is a parameter affecting the beneficiary’s valuation of ineligible rides 
and  is the broker’s effort in screening user and trip eligibility.
),,( sqyi
s 1 The parameter y is 
                                                 
1 It is in the broker’s best interest to verify a user's Medicaid eligibility, as the state will 
later verify the rider’s Medicaid eligibility and will reimburse a trip only if the rider’s 
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distributed between  and  with distribution function . For any given amount of 
rides, a beneficiary’s marginal valuation of ineligible rides increases as y increases. 
0y 1y )( yL
 The demands for both eligible and ineligible rides are increasing in both the 
beneficiary’s valuation and the broker’s quality-assurance effort, i.e., , 
, , and . Furthermore, the demand for ineligible 
rides is decreasing in the broker’s screening effort, i.e., 
0),( >qxjx
0),( >qxjq 0),,( >sqyiy 0),,( >sqyiq
0),,( <sqxis . 
 Beneficiaries who place little value on NEMT services have no demand for rides. 
We define  and  as the values of x and y such that a user with an evaluation less 
than  and  has zero demand for eligible and ineligible rides, respectively. 
Formally,  and 
*x *y
*x *y
0)*,( ≡qxj 0),*,( ≡sqyi . It can be readily shown that both  and  
decrease in the broker’s quality-assurance effort but  increases in the broker’s 
screening effort. It suggests that the number of beneficiaries using the services increases 
in the broker’s quality-assurance effort but decreases in the broker’s screening effort.  
*x *y
*y
 For the overall beneficiary population, the demands for eligible and ineligible 
rides are  and , respectively. Therefore, the 
overall demand for rides is .  
∫= 1* )(),(xx xdFqxjJ ∫= 1* )(),,(yy ydLsqyiI
∫∫ += 11 ** )(),,()(),(),( yyxx ydLsqyixdFqxjsqD
 Note that 
                                                                                                                                                 
Medicaid eligibility is confirmed by the state.  Therefore, we focus our analysis on the 
demand of Medicaid beneficiaries only.  
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dq
dyylsqyiydLsqyi
dq
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,           (2) 
where  and  are the probability density functions for )(xf )( yl x  and y  respectively. 
Therefore, the demand for rides increases as the broker’s quality-assurance effort 
increases, but decreases as the broker’s screening effort increases. 
 Lemma 1 summarizes the above properties regarding the demand for NEMT 
services. 
Lemma 1. A given user’s demand for the services, the number of beneficiaries using the 
services, and therefore the total demand for services, all increase in the broker’s quality-
assurance effort but decrease in its screening effort. 
 
3.2. The broker’s problem. 
Each broker in the NEMT program is offered a contract , which specifies the 
broker’s share of transit services, r, the brokerage fee, b, that the broker receives for each 
claim
},,{ tbr
2, and the transit fee, t, that the transit service provider receives for each claim. The 
amount of ineligible claims detected by the state administration, )(Iα , is increasing in 
the actual number of ineligible claims, I, i.e., 0)(' >Iα . For each ineligible claim 
detected by the state administration, the broker incurs a loss of m. 
                                                 
2 A claim is a one-way ride per beneficiary. 
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 The total cost of brokerage services is , where  is the broker’s effort 
in reducing brokerage cost. The brokerage cost is increasing in the number of claims and 
decreasing in the broker’s cost-reduction effort at a decreasing rate, i.e., , 
, , and .  
),( beDH be
0),( >bD eDH
0),( <be eDH 0),( <bDD eDH 0),( >bee eDH
 The total transit cost is , where  is the broker’s effort in reducing 
transit cost. As the number of claims increases, a broker can transport more beneficiaries 
with one vehicle or better organize claims to reduce the number of trips. Therefore, the 
total transit cost is increasing in the number of claims at a decreasing rate, i.e., 
 and . Furthermore, the total transit cost is decreasing in the 
broker’s cost-reduction effort at a decreasing rate, i.e., 
),( teDG te
0),( >tD eDG 0),( <tDD eDG
0),( <te eDG  and . 
The broker’s share of transit cost is , as r is the broker’s share of transit 
services. 
0),( >tee eDG
),( teDrG
 The broker’s cost of effort is , where )(EC tb eeqsE +++≡ . The cost of effort 
is increasing in effort at an increasing rate, thus,  and . 0)(' >EC 0)('' >EC
 The State cannot observe the broker’s effort supply, and therefore cannot specify 
the broker’s effort supply in the service contract. Consequently, a moral hazard problem 
arises as the broker will allocate its efforts to maximize its expected profit. The broker’s 
optimization problem is determining  to maximize  },,,{ tb eesq
 mIECeDrGeDHDrtb tb )()()],(),([)( α−−+−+=Π .          (3) 
 Denote the broker’s maximum profit under a given contract as . The broker 
will participate in the contract only if 
*Π
0* ≥Π , i.e., its maximum profit under the contract 
is nonnegative. 
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 The first-order conditions of the broker’s optimization problem are given by 
 ;0),()(')(')],(),()()[,( =−−−−+=∂
Π∂ msqIIECeDrGeDHrtbsqD
q qtDbDq
α     (4) 
 0)('])('),(),()()[,( =−−−−+=∂
Π∂ ECmIeDrGeDHrtbsqI
s tDbDs
α ; (5) 
 0)('),( =−−=∂
Π∂ ECeDH
e beb
; and (6) 
 0)('),( =−−=∂
Π∂ ECeDrG
e tet
. (7) 
 Equations (4)-(7) determine the broker’s effort allocation among quality 
assurance, eligibility screening, and cost reduction. 
 From equation (4) and by the use of the Envelope theorem, 
 
2
2
2
2
2
]),()[,(
q
teDGsqD
q
rq
dr
dq tDq
∂
Π∂
−=
∂
Π∂
∂∂
Π∂
−=  . (8) 
The second-order condition of the optimization problem requires 02
2
≤∂
Π∂
q
.3 Further, 
since ,  must be true for transit service providers to cover 
their costs. Therefore, 
0),( <tDD eDG ),( tD eDGt >
0>
dr
dq , i.e., the broker’s quality-assurance effort increases as its 
share of transit services increases. 
 From equation (5) and by the use of the Envelope theorem, 
                                                 
3 We assume that the second-order conditions for the broker’s optimization problem are 
satisfied. 
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 0
]),()[,(
2
2 ≤
∂
Π∂
−=
s
teDGsqI
dr
ds tDs ,  (9) 
as the second-order condition of the optimization problem requires 02
2
≤∂
Π∂
s
. Therefore, 
the broker’s screening effort decreases as its share of transit services increases. 
 Then, from Lemma 1, a given user’s demand for the services, the number of 
beneficiaries using the services, and the total demand for services must increase as the 
broker’s share of transit services increases.  
 We present these findings regarding the demands for NEMT services in 
Proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 1. A given user’s demand for services, the number of beneficiaries using the 
services, and the total demand for services increase as the broker’s share of transit 
services increases. 
 
 Furthermore, from equations (6) and (7), 
 0=
dr
deb ; and (10) 
 0
)(''),(
),( >+−= ECeDG
eDG
dr
de
tee
tet . (11) 
 The above equations suggest that increasing the broker’s share of transit services 
raises the broker’s effort in reducing transit costs, but has no effect on the broker’s effort 
in reducing brokerage cost. 
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 Denote AC as the total cost per claim, i.e., DeDGeDHAC tb /)),(),(( +≡ . The 
broker’s share of transit services affects total cost per claim in two ways. Firs, it affects 
the demand for services; second, it affects the broker’s cost-reduction effort. 
 Holding the number of rides constant, the second effect of the broker’s share of 
transit services is 
 0<=
dr
de
D
G
dr
dAC te ,  
i.e., total cost per claim is decreasing in the broker’s share of transit services for any 
given number of rides. 
 The overall effect of the broker’s share of transit services is 
 
dr
de
D
G
D
DGDGDHDH
dr
dAC terDrD +−+−= 2
)()(
. (12) 
Since  and ( , ) 0DD bH D e < ( , , ) 0DD tG r D e < ,  DDH H<  and . Therefore, 
, i.e., total cost per claim decreases as the broker’s share of transit services 
increases. Notice that the first term on the right-hand side of equation (12) is the effect of 
the broker’s share of transit services on total cost per claim through the demand for 
services. 
DDG G<
0/ <drdAC
 We present the above findings regarding the costs of NEMT services in 
proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2. As the broker’s share of transit services increases, 1) total cost per claim 
for any given number of claims decreases; 2) total cost per claim of the NEMT program 
overall also decreases. 
 
   12
 We next use data from Florida’ NEMT programs to test our theoretical 
propositions regarding the incentive effects of organizational forms. 
 
4. Data and Methods 
4.1. Variables and data source 
We obtained the cost and utilization data of the Florida’s NEMT programs from 
the Florida Medicaid Management Information System maintained by Florida’s Agency 
for Health Care Administration. The data include the total cost, number of users, number 
of claims, number of beneficiaries, and organizational forms of the NEMT programs in 
all sixty-seven counties in Florida from fiscal year 1991 to 2002.  
Table 2 presents definitions of all variables used in the empirical analysis, with 
dependent variables in the upper panel, and explanatory variables in the lower panel. 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for all variables. Table 4 presents the number of 
counties adopting different organizational forms between fiscal year 1996 and 2002.  
 
4.2. Econometric Method 
4.2.1. Performance functions 
We use a fixed effect panel data framework to examine the effects of organizational 
forms on the performance of the NEMT programs. The fixed effect specification captures 
differences across programs that are time-invariant and differences over time that are 
common to all programs.  
 The relationships between organizational forms and the cost and utilization of the 
program are estimated using the following equation: 
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where t is an index of fiscal years and k is a county index (k =1, 2, …, 67).  
represents the dependent variable i for county k in year t. The dependent variable is UPB 
(user per beneficiary) when , CPU (claims per user) when 
i
tkX
1=i 2=i , and CPC (cost per 
claim) when . The symbol ln represents the natural logarithm. For example,  
represents the natural logarithm of cost per claim for the k
3=i 3ln tkX
th county in the tth fiscal year. 
 As we have shown in our analysis, both the number of claims and the broker’s 
cost-reduction effort affect total cost per claim. To pinpoint the effect of organizational 
form on the broker’s cost-reduction effort, we also use the following equation to estimate 
the relationship between total cost per claim and organizational forms controlling the 
number of claims: 
           (14) 
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 The explanatory variables of primary interest in all the above equations are the 
dummy variables FI, PI, and BO. FI is a dummy variable for the Fully Integrated model, 
PI for the Partially Integrated model, and BO for the Brokerage Only model. The 
performance under the previous fee-for-service approach is the basis of comparison. 
Therefore, the coefficients of the dummy variables FI, PI, and BO capture the effect of 
organizational forms on performance in comparison with the fee-for-service approach. 
By doing so, we fully utilize the data from fiscal year 1991 to 1995, when the NEMT 
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program was under the fee-for-service model, to better control for time-invariant county-
specific factors and the trend of NEMT services. 
CI is a price index of transportation services for each county. The price of 
transportation services in a county may not only affect the CTC’s provision of transit 
services, but also influence beneficiaries’ usage of NEMT services. For example, a higher 
price for transportation services could drive more beneficiaries to use NEMT services and 
at the same time compel CTCs to try to reduce usage of the system. DOC is the number 
of doctors of medicine or osteopathy per square mile in each county. More doctors in a 
specific area could lead to, on average, a shorter trip per claim (and also reduce the 
number of the more expensive out-of-county trips) and less usage of NEMT services by 
beneficiaries. REVN is the state’s per capita revenue in each fiscal year which captures 
the state’s budget situation. The variable is important since the state’s fiscal health could 
influence pressures on AHCA or CTCs to control costs. FY captures changes in 
conditions related to the provision of NEMT services over the years. N_CTY measures 
county-specific characteristics affecting the provision of NEMT services for each county. 
ClAIM is the number of claims of the NEMT program. The  terms are the coefficients 
to be estimated, and  is a random error that has a zero mean and a standard deviation 
equal to . 
iα
i
ktε
iσ
 
4.2.2. The Choice of Organizational Form 
 It is possible that the choice of organizational form is endogenous. First, CTCs 
may determine the organizational form of NEMT programs based on some county 
characteristics and broker characteristics. Second, the organizational form may have a 
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selection effect on brokers. For example, brokers who chose to participate in a Fully 
Integrated model may be more efficient in transit services than those who chose to 
participate in a Brokerage Only model. If  includes any of those county or broker 
characteristics that correlate with the choice of organizational form, the estimates of 
performance functions are biased. 
i
ktε
To account for the endogeneity of the choice of organizational form, we estimate 
the performance equations using a two-step procedure—an instrumental variables 
method.  
First, we estimate the choice of organizational form as a function of demographic 
and political characteristics of a county, using a multinomial logit model: 
      (15)  ),,, ,,,,,( GASPRPARTYSHMINPOVERTYPOPLANDCIBENfFORM =
where FORM is the organizational form of the program. FORM equals 1 for Fully 
Integrated, 2 for Partially Integrated, and 3 for Brokerage Only. LAND is the land area of 
each county; POP is the population of each county. Since there are more large-size 
transportation firms operating in more densely populated markets, the population and 
land area of a county could be correlated with the size and efficiency of transportation 
providers. POVERTY is the share of population living in poverty. SHMIN is the share of 
minority population. Since a large percentage of small transportation firms are owned by 
minorities, a larger presence of minority makes it more difficult for CTC to award all 
services to one large firm. PARTY is the absolute value of the share of Democrats among 
registered voters in each county minus 0.5. It measures the extent to which the county is 
controlled by one political party. It might be more difficult for the CTC to grant all 
services to one provider if either political party has control of the county. GASPR is 
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gasoline sales per resident in each county, which reflects transportation conditions in the 
county. 
 Second, we obtain the predicted values of FI, PI, and BO based on the estimated 
choice functions. Third, we estimate the performance equations using the predicted value 
of FI, PI, and BO as the instruments for these variables. 
 Finally, we also estimate equations (13) and (14) directly by the method of 
ordinary least-squares. The estimation results from the two different methods are 
compared as a check for the robustness of the results. 
 
5. Estimation Results 
5.1. The choice of organizational form 
 Table 5 presents the estimates of the choice function with the Partially Integrated 
model as the comparison group. Consistent with our conjectures, compared with the 
Partially Integrated model, the Fully Integrated model is more likely to arise in counties 
with a smaller percentage of minority population or a higher population density, or more 
dominated by one political party. On the other hand, the Brokerage Only model is more 
likely to arise in counties with a larger percentage of minority population or a lower 
population density, or less dominated by one political party. Moreover, both the Fully 
Integrated model and the Brokerage Only model are less likely to arise in counties with 
more gasoline sales per resident. 
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5.2. The effect of organizational form. 
Tables 6 to 9 present the estimates of the performance functions using the two-
step procedure. To focus on the effect of organizational forms on performance, we do not 
report the estimates for the county dummy variables. 
Table 6 presents the regression results for the effect of organizational form on the 
number of users per beneficiary. The coefficients of FI and PI are 0.1 and 0.03, which 
indicates that the proportion of beneficiaries using NEMT services increased by 10 
percent in Fully Integrated programs and 3 percent in Partially Integrated programs, 
although the increase in Partially Integrated programs is not statistically significant. The 
coefficient for BO is -0.28, suggesting that the proportion of beneficiaries using NEMT 
services decreased by 24 percent in Brokerage Only programs. 
Table 7 presents the regression results for the effect of organizational form on the 
number of claims per user. The coefficients of FI and PI are positive and highly 
significant, meaning that claims per user have increased under these two organizational 
structures in a statistically significant way. The results indicate that, on average, claims 
per user have risen by 9 percent under the Partially Integrated model and 15 percent 
under the Fully Integrated model. The coefficient of BO is insignificant both 
economically and statistically, suggesting that claims per user under the Brokerage Only 
model is not significantly different from those under the previous fee-for-service model. 
The above regression results suggest that the number of users and the number of 
claims per user of a NEMT program increase as the broker’s share of transit services 
increases, as predicted by Proposition 1. 
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Table 8 presents the regression results for the overall effect of organizational form 
on cost per claim (Equation (13)). The coefficients of FI and PI are negative and highly 
significant statistically, meaning that NEMT programs with these organizational forms 
have reduced total cost per claim in a statistically significant way. The results indicate 
that, on average, Fully Integrated programs have reduced cost per claim by 38%, and 
Partially Integrated programs have reduced cost per claim by 25%. On the other hand, 
Brokerage Only programs do not show significant changes in cost per claim.  
Table 9 presents the regression results for equation (14) which focuses on the 
effect of the organizational form on the broker’s effort-reduction effort. The coefficients 
of FI and PI are -0.44 and -0.27 respectively, and both are highly significant statistically. 
The results suggest that, holding the number of claims constant, Fully Integrated 
programs have reduced cost per claim by 36%, and Partially Integrated programs have 
reduced cost per claim by 24%. In contrast, Brokerage Only programs do not show 
significant changes in cost per claim even after controlling the number of claims. It is 
noteworthy that the coefficient for lnCLAIM is -0.16 and statistically significant, 
suggesting economies of scale for NEMT services.  
The results in Tables 8 and 9 suggest that total cost per claim for a given number 
of claims and total cost per claim for a NEMT program overall decrease as the broker’s 
share of transit services increases, as predicted by Proposition 2. Moreover, a comparison 
between the results in Tables 8 and 9 suggests that more than 90 percent of the overall 
reduction in total cost per claim for a NEMT program is caused by the increased cost-
reduction effort under the brokerage models. 
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As a check for the robustness of the above results, we also estimate equations (13) 
and (14) by the method of ordinary least-squares. Tables 10 to 13 present estimates of the 
performance functions using ordinary least-squares estimation. These estimates 
demonstrate the same effects of organizational structures on program performance as the 
instrumental variables, although the magnitudes of the effects are smaller. Thus the 
empirical support for our theoretical propositions on the incentive effects of 
organizational forms is robust to the exact empirical specification. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The theoretical literature on incentive contracts has been well developed. However, the 
empirical validation of the theory has long lagged behind the theoretical work. In this 
paper, we provide an empirical test of the incentive effects of organizational forms, using 
data from Florida’s Non-Emergency Medicaid Transportation (NEMT) programs. 
 We analyze the incentive effects of different organizational forms of Florida’s 
NEMT program with a simple model of moral hazard. The theoretical propositions are 
tested using the cost and utilization data of Florida’s Non-Emergency Transportation 
programs. We estimate the incentive effects using both a direct ordinary least-squares 
method and a two-step procedure to control for the endogeneity of the choice of 
organizational form. The empirical evidence supports our theoretical propositions and is 
robust to empirical specifications. 
Our study suggests that the choice of organizational forms has important incentive 
effects on performance. It contributes to a small but growing body of evidence supporting 
the existence of incentive effect in organizations. 
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Table 2. Regression Variables 
 
Variable Definition 
UPBtk Users per beneficiary 
CPUtk Claims per user 
CPCtk Inflation-discounted average cost per claim 
FORMtk The organizational form of the NEMT program of each county in 
each fiscal year defined as 1 for Fully Integrated, 2 for Partially 
Integrated, and 3 for Brokerage Only. 
FFStk A dummy variable defined as 1 if the NEMT program is under 
previous fee-for-service delivery model, and 0 otherwise 
BOtk A dummy variable defined as 1 if CTC is Brokerage Only type, and 
0 otherwise 
PItk A dummy variable defined as 1 if CTC is Partially Integrated type, 
and 0 otherwise 
FItk A dummy variable defined as 1 if CTC is Sole Source type, and 0 
otherwise 
CLAIMtk Number of claims in each county in each fiscal year 
FYt Fiscal year 
BENtk Number of beneficiaries in each county in each fiscal year 
DOCtk Number of doctors of medicine or osteopathy per square mile in 
each county in each fiscal year 
POPtk Population of each county in each fiscal year 
LANDk Land area of each county 
CItk The transportation price index for each county in each fiscal year 
REVNt The state’s per capita revenue in each fiscal year 
POVERTYtk Share of population in poverty in each county in each fiscal year 
SHMINtk Share of minority population in each county in each fiscal year 
PARTYtk The absolute value of share of democrats among registered voters 
minus .5 in each county in each fiscal year 
GASPRtk Gas sales per resident in each county in each fiscal year 
N_CTYk Sixty six dummy variables that equal 1 for county N=k, and 0 for 
all other counties, where N = 2,…, 67 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics for Key Variables 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
COST 55.20 63.36 9.22 807.00
UPB 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.30
CPU 12.61 6.06 3.88 86.00
CPC 41.74 18.41 10.35 146.42
CLAIM 30445 57467 85 676027
BEN 27201 55173 78 495045
DOC 0.59 1.24 0.00 9.39
CI 98.06 2.27 88.98 107.92
LAND 805 385 240 2025
POP 221874 369693 5659 2318845
REVN 2462.67 178.00 2065.89 2644.15
POVERTY 15.52 4.87 0.07 0.29
SHMIN 0.17 0.10 0.02 0.61
PARTY 0.18 .12 .00 .46
GASPR 503.84 108.82 274.30 797.70
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Number of Counties Adopting Different Organizational Forms 
 
Fiscal 
Year 
Complete 
Brokerage 
Partial 
Brokerage 
Sole 
Source 
1996 10 45 12 
1997 9 45 13 
1998 9 45 13 
1999 9 44 14 
2000 12 41 14 
2001 12 41 14 
2002 12 41 14 
 
 
   26
Table 5. Regression Results for CTCs’ Selection of Organizational Form 
 
 Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z| 
Fully Integrated 
BEN 0.000 0.000 6.500 0.000
CI 0.153 0.081 1.890 0.059
LAND 0.002 0.001 3.330 0.001
POVERTY -0.351 0.060 -5.870 0.000
GASPR -0.009 0.001 -6.170 0.000
SHMIN -3.666 2.112 -1.740 0.083
PARTY 1.943 1.701 1.140 0.253
POP 0.000 0.000 -7.050 0.000
CONSTANT -5.264 7.880 -0.670 0.504
Brokerage Only 
BEN 0.000 0.000 -1.970 0.049
CI 0.224 0.088 2.560 0.011
LAND 0.000 0.000 -0.700 0.481
POVERTY 0.107 0.041 2.640 0.008
GASPR -0.008 0.002 -4.570 0.000
SHMIN 3.251 1.586 2.050 0.040
PARTY -10.903 1.893 -5.760 0.000
POP 0.000 0.000 0.200 0.841
CONSTANT -19.485 8.405 -2.320 0.020
Pseudo R2    0.292 
 
*The Partially Integrated model is used as the comparison group. 
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Table 6. Two-Step Procedure Estimates of Equation (13) 
(Users per Beneficiary) 
 
 Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z| 
FI 0.099 0.058 1.710 0.087
PI 0.032 0.035 0.900 0.370
BO -0.284 0.083 -3.430 0.001
ln CI 1.284 0.461 2.780 0.006
ln BEN -0.183 0.069 -2.650 0.008
ln REVN 1.446 0.241 6.000 0.000
ln DOC -0.187 0.040 -4.620 0.000
FY  -0.066 0.005 -12.240 0.000
 R2  0.780 
 
 
Table 7. Two-Step Procedure Estimates of Equation (13) 
(Claims per User) 
 
 Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z| 
FI 0.143 0.064 2.220 0.027
PI 0.086 0.039 2.180 0.030
BO 0.007 0.093 0.080 0.938
ln CI -0.609 0.514 -1.180 0.237
ln BEN -0.355 0.077 -4.590 0.000
ln REVN 0.730 0.269 2.710 0.007
ln DOC -0.021 0.045 -0.470 0.642
FY  0.040 0.006 6.580 0.000
 R2    0.665 
 
 
Table 8. Two-Step Procedure Estimates of Equation (13) 
(Cost per Claim) 
 
 Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z| 
FI -0.486 0.063 -7.770 0.000
PI -0.292 0.038 -7.610 0.000
BO -0.003 0.090 -0.030 0.978
ln CI 1.515 0.500 3.030 0.003
ln BEN 0.111 0.075 1.480 0.140
ln REVN -0.540 0.261 -2.070 0.039
ln DOC -0.023 0.044 -0.520 0.606
FY  0.022 0.006 3.840 0.000
 R2    0.724 
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Table 9. Two-Step Procedure Estimates of Equation (14) 
(Cost per Claim) 
 
 Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z| 
FI -0.447 0.062 -7.250 0.000
PI -0.273 0.038 -7.230 0.000
BO -0.047 0.088 -0.540 0.593
ln CI 1.625 0.490 3.310 0.001
ln BEN 0.186 0.075 2.480 0.013
ln REVN -0.188 0.264 -0.710 0.477
ln DOC -0.056 0.043 -1.300 0.195
FY 0.018 0.006 3.140 0.002
ln CLAIM -0.162 0.029 -5.590 0.000
 R2    0.735 
 
 
Table 10. Least-Squares Estimates of Equation (13) 
(Users per Beneficiary) 
 
 Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z| 
FI 0.076 0.041 1.820 0.069
PI -0.027 0.030 -0.910 0.365
BO -0.086 0.043 -2.020 0.044
ln CI 1.116 0.443 2.520 0.012
ln BEN -0.173 0.070 -2.470 0.014
ln REVN 1.365 0.242 5.630 0.000
ln DOC -0.187 0.040 -4.630 0.000
FY  -0.063 0.005 -11.850 0.000
 R2  0.779 
 
 
Table 11. Least-Squares Estimates of Equation (13) 
(Claims per User) 
 
 Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z| 
FI 0.116 0.046 2.520 0.012
PI 0.073 0.033 2.210 0.027
BO 0.056 0.048 1.190 0.236
ln CI -0.598 0.494 -1.210 0.226
ln BEN -0.351 0.078 -4.500 0.000
ln REVN 0.699 0.270 2.590 0.010
ln DOC -0.023 0.045 -0.520 0.603
FY  0.041 0.006 6.920 0.000
 R2    0.665 
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Table 12. Least-Squares Estimates of Equation (13) 
(Cost per Claim) 
 
 Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z| 
FI -0.377 0.045 -8.430 0.000
PI -0.260 0.032 -8.080 0.000
BO -0.116 0.046 -2.520 0.012
ln CI 1.4637 0.479 3.060 0.002
ln BEN 0.110 0.076 1.450 0.146
ln REVN -0.453 0.262 -1.730 0.084
ln DOC -0.018 0.044 -0.420 0.673
FY  0.0167 0.006 2.910 0.004
 R2    0.725 
 
 
Table 13. Least-Squares Estimates of Equation (14) 
(Cost per Claim) 
 
 Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z| 
FI -0.346 0.044 -7.830 0.000
PI -0.252 0.032 -8.000 0.000
BO -0.121 0.045 -2.680 0.008
ln CI 1.548 0.469 3.300 0.001
ln BEN 0.187 0.075 2.490 0.013
ln REVN -0.118 0.263 -0.450 0.654
ln DOC -0.053 0.043 -1.220 0.224
FY 0.013 0.006 2.310 0.021
ln CLAIM -0.162 0.029 -5.630 0.000
 R2    0.736 
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